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Introduction
Over the last decades, demands on environmental policies have 
fundamentally changed. The societal desideratum of a sustaina-
ble development integrating environmental and economic goals 
has certainly contributed to this development. Consequently, in 
particular in highly developed countries, more and more rather 
complex constructs, often associated with multiple economic and 
societal goals, complement the classical instruments, such as 
straightforward command-and-control policies regulating emis-
sions of hazardous substances, for instance. Waste electrical and 
electronic equipment (WEEE) policies focusing on a ‘design for 
environment’ constitute examples for these special holistic 
approaches to environmental policy.
The development of waste management in general provides 
another interesting example in this context. Today, a functional 
‘integrated’ waste management (IWM) system combines waste 
collection, treatment and disposal methods in a rather sophisti-
cated way. The concept was evolved in 1975 from the mission 
statement of the Solid Waste Authority of Palm Beach County, 
Florida. According to this statement, the Authority would 
‘develop and implement programs in accordance with its 
Comprehensive Plan by integrating solid waste transportation, 
processing, recycling, resource recovery and disposal technolo-
gies’ (McDougall et al., 2003: 21). Since then the concept has 
further developed, especially in highly industrialised countries, 
into a holistic approach to waste management comprising now 
– under the roof of the waste hierarchy – various waste manage-
ment activities, such as avoidance of waste, reuse of discarded 
components, recovery and environmentally sound recycling. 
Bilitewski et al. (1994) initiated this development with a com-
prehensive discussion of all aspects of (integrated) waste man-
agement, and Wilson (1996) examined in this context ‘the 
development of integrated sets of policy measures by countries 
around the world …’ (Wilson, 1996: 389). Parallel to the 
changes in the comprehension of waste management, there 
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was an adaptation of the technical infrastructure. Uyarra and 
Gee (2013) describe this complex process of a ‘sustainable 
transformation of urban infrastructure’ in the sense of moving 
‘away from landfill and towards more sustainable waste man-
agement’ (Uyarra and Gee, 2013: 102) for the case of Greater 
Manchester (UK).
The latest step in this development has been taken by the 
European Union (EU) Commission with the ‘Circular Economy 
Package’ adopted at the end of 2015. Its goal is to enhance and 
accelerate the transition to a circular economy, also with funding 
from EU sources (see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-
economy/index_en.htm). In this context, one also has to mention 
the activities of the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, which, founded 
in 2009, has since then worked ‘with business, government and 
academia to build a framework for an economy that is restorative 
and regenerative by design’ (see https://www.ellenmacarthur-
foundation.org).
As already indicated, this new holistic thinking on waste asso-
ciated with IWM is of relevance for other environmental policy 
areas, too. This is true, for example, for extended producer 
responsibility (EPR), with its attempt to extend a producer’s 
responsibility to the design and the post-consumer stage of a 
product’s lifecycle. EPR, thus, plays an important role in WEEE 
policies. Observe that these holistic policies, besides environ-
mental goals, typically also have the goal to stimulate research 
and to promote business activities in the respective field. Again, 
technical developments and environmental policies complement 
one another.
Thus, the research question arising in this context refers to the 
general applicability of these holistic policies as allocation mech-
anisms for environmental commodities. To put it another way: 
Assume that we have specific goals for a particular waste policy 
(reduction of waste, waste recovery and recycling quota, design 
for environment (DfE) for particular products, restriction of 
exports of waste commodities, …, or a combination of those 
goals), what are the constitutive elements of this waste policy, 
necessary to reach these goals, to work without deficiencies – to 
develop into an ‘integrated’ environmental policy?
This research question is not only of theoretical relevance. 
Current experience with a variety of holistic approaches from 
European countries shows that designing a fully functional envi-
ronmental policy is anything but straightforward and simple. 
Existing environmental policies on WEEE, for example, give 
proof. Current WEEE policies seem to motivate excessive semi-
legal export activities with WEEE often ending up in developing 
countries, which is certainly not the goal of WEEE policies. Babu 
et al. (2007) survey various global aspects of WEEE recycling, 
Ongondo et al. (2011) provide a global view of the management 
of WEEE and Schnoor (2012) highlights also the situation 
regarding e-waste in developing countries.
Systematic economic-minded approaches to this research 
question are still missing in the literature. This does not contra-
dict the fact that many articles address aspects of these questions, 
and that various existing environmental policies achieve their 
goals. Wilson (1996), for example, refers to a ‘combination of 
measures’, including economic ones, for an IWM strategy 
(Wilson, 1996: 397), and Marshall and Farahbakhsh (2013) pro-
vide an interesting survey on the development of solid waste 
management including the associated literature.
Given this situation, the aim of the article is first of all to 
investigate the economic background of integrated environmen-
tal policies, associated with specific goals. We introduce and 
motivate constitutive elements, which are necessary for inte-
grated policies to reach their goals. We call policies, satisfying 
these constitutive elements, ‘integrated environmental policies’, 
as this procedure implies the integration of environmental com-
modities into the economic allocation problems. The section 
‘The intrinsic nature of integrated environmental policies’ 
explains this ‘intrinsic’ nature of integrated environmental poli-
cies and the associated research gap. ‘The Methodology’ intro-
duces and discusses the methodology, whereas ‘Constitutive 
elements of integrated environmental policies’ presents the nec-
essary structural properties of integrated environmental policies, 
the constitutive elements, in detail. Examples for more or less 
effective approaches in the context of waste management illus-
trate, or rather prove, their relevance. ‘A proposal for an inte-
grated WEEE Policy’ presents a proposal for an integrated 
environmental policy for WEEE. The final section summarises 
the main results.
In conclusion, the article provides a systematic economic-
minded approach, as well as practical insight into economic 
aspects of (integrated) environmental policies. More than 20 years 
of experience with holistic approaches have resulted in a large 
number of publications in prominent journals. Although many of 
these articles touch constitutive elements of integrated environ-
mental policies in the sense of our approach, a theoretical and 
systematic economic approach to integrated environmental poli-
cies is still missing. The article presents some of the more recent 
publications in their relation to the constitutive elements of inte-
grated environmental policies.
The intrinsic nature of integrated 
environmental policies
As already indicated, the concept of IWM has evolved from a 
mere technical handling of waste with an increasing emphasis on 
recycling, to a sophisticated system of waste management with a 
profound economic basis. Whereas earlier versions of IWM 
focused on the ‘integration’ of various activities, such as collec-
tion and treatment of waste, more advanced versions pay more 
and more attention to the ‘integration’ of the economic subjects 
relevant for a successful management of waste. Thus, not only 
the companies collecting, sorting, treating and recycling waste 
were addressed, but also households and production companies 
with their often-underestimated potential to reduce waste. 
Particularly this step requires guidance of the economic agents 
by means of an adequate policy, which accompanies or even initi-
ates changes in the infrastructure. Uyarra and Gee (2013) refer to 
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the ‘significant technological, political and financial challenges’ 
associated with the transformation of the waste management sys-
tem in Greater Manchester (see the Abstract). The remaining step 
taken in this article is then considering a specific kind of waste, 
or rather reducing this waste, as an economic ‘commodity’, as an 
environmental commodity, and therefore ‘integrating’ waste 
appropriately into the economic allocation problems.
The ‘allocation problems’ refer to the basics of any economic 
system by addressing the questions of which commodities and 
how many units of them to produce in a certain time period, how 
to produce these commodities (environment-friendly, for exam-
ple) and for whom. These fundamental problems have to be 
solved in any economic system, and they are solved in any eco-
nomic system. Clearly, the state of the environment in a certain 
country is a consequence of the particular solution of the alloca-
tion problems with respect to the environmental commodities in 
this and, in view of global environmental commodities, poten-
tially also in the neighbouring countries.
Thus, the ‘integration’ of environmental commodities into the 
economic allocation problems is quite natural. Owing to the pub-
lic goods nature and the external effects associated with most of 
these commodities, it is not possible to extend the well-known 
market mechanism, the allocation mechanism in a market econ-
omy, straightforwardly to environmental commodities. The goal 
is, thus, to establish integrated environmental policies as appro-
priate allocation mechanisms – with properties related to those of 
the market mechanism.
In view of these remarks, the research gap addressed in this 
article refers to an up-to-now missing systematic approach to waste 
policies: What structural properties are necessary in order to reach 
their specific goals? These structural properties are of relevance for 
any waste policy, and they help to design functional policies.
The following section explains the methodology of this 
approach in more detail and provides also more information on 
the selection of the various examples applied in this article.
The methodology
The research question stated in the Introduction and the research 
gap elaborated in the section ‘The intrinsic nature of integrated 
environmental policies’ point first of all to a theoretical context: 
What structural properties are required for an integrated environ-
mental policy to serve as an allocation mechanism for environmen-
tal commodities with specific policy goals? Current examples of 
holistic environmental policies from highly developed countries 
reveal more or less severe deficiencies. By analysing these deficien-
cies, we arrive at a set of necessary properties: If a concrete waste 
policy does not satisfy one or the other of these structural proper-
ties, then the policy need not be fully functional. The examples pro-
vide insight into this relationship and allow the conclusion that 
these structural properties are of relevance for any waste policy.
This helps to explain the selection of the examples presented 
in the article. In order to motivate the necessity of the structural 
properties, we have to find a policy violating one of the structural 
properties, and which does not reach its goals. Waste policies in 
developing countries seem to be easy candidates. However, in 
order to arrive at policies, which satisfy some of the structural 
properties, but not all, one has to look for more sophisticated 
policies. Those can be found in the industrialised countries, 
where the legal framework conditions are stable and allow for 
more elaborated policies.
Although most of the examples presented in this article are 
from Germany, it is, of course, possible to analyse the Dutch 
waste policy or the South Korean or Japanese approach to WEEE 
along the same lines. The example regarding a ban of a herbicide 
highlights this universal applicability.
The question, whether these structural properties characterise 
an integrated environmental policy, requires a rigid formal model 
– which is not the aim of this practical-minded approach. However, 
owing to obvious parallels to the market mechanism, a positive 
answer is not unlikely. The origin of these constitutive elements are 
to be found in corresponding aspects of the market mechanism.
For a concrete waste policy, these abstract structural proper-
ties have to be ‘filled’ with appropriate tools and instruments, 
which coordinate individual decisions to achieve the policy 
goals. This corresponds to the task of the price system in a market 
system. In general, a mixture of tools, linked in an appropriate 
way, will be necessary to design a functioning policy.
Thus, the structural properties are the same for any integrated 
environmental policy, but the policy tools are dependent on the 
concrete goals of the policy. This results not only from the fact that 
a WEEE policy typically needs other tools than a policy for end-of-
life vehicles. The available technical infrastructure affects also the 
feasibility of certain policy tools. Moreover, often various tools are 
available and a decision has to be made as to which one to adopt.
This is the topic of many publications on holistic policies, 
applicable also to integrated environmental policies. Common 
evaluation tools, such as SWOT analyses, cost-benefit analyses 
and others, can be applied in these cases to make a justified deci-
sion. For example, Gallardo et al. (2010) and Gallardo et al. 
(2012) use indicators to quantify the efficiency of certain waste 
collection systems for household waste in Spain.
Bovea et al. (2010) and Puig et al. (2013) employ life cycle 
assessments for the management of solid waste and industrial 
waste, respetively, and Bernad-Beltrán et al. (2014) base their anal-
ysis of selective collection of biowaste on semi-structured telephone 
interviews. With respect to EPR, Rodrigues et al. (2016) develop an 
input–output model to assess the impacts of an EPR system.
The next section is now devoted to introduce and discuss the 
structural properties, the constitutive elements, of relevance for 
any integrated environmental policy.
Constitutive elements of integrated 
environmental policies
The market mechanism as a prominent allocation mechanism 
yields equilibrium solutions of the allocation problems with cer-
tain characteristic properties. Integrated environmental policies, 
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characterised by constitutive elements, are meant to supplement 
the market mechanism in the context of environmental commodi-
ties. The following constitutive elements (CE) will be discussed 
in the context of real life examples in the following sections:
CE I: Dependence of the policy on local conditions – Feasible 
solutions of the allocation problems, in particular market solu-
tions, depend on local conditions. This should be reflected in the 
integrated policies.
CE II: Integrating affected economic agents into the policy and 
addressing a potentially large number of involved agents by 
means of appropriate framework conditions – The allocation 
problems in a market system are interdependent. Therefore, any 
interference with the allocation problems can affect a multitude 
of economic agents. This should be taken into account in inte-
grated policies.
CE III: Identifying appropriate signals and linking them ade-
quately through policy tools – In a market economy, individual 
agents, consumers and producers, use the price signals to formu-
late their demand and supply decisions. Owing to the existence of 
external effects, environmental policies have to be made depend-
ent on other, additional signals.
Aspects of ‘Extended Producer Responsibility’ are of some rele-
vance in each one of the examples presented in the article. We 
therefore discuss briefly this generic holistic approach to envi-
ronmental policy, which has gained importance in environmental 
legislation in recent years. Thereafter, we turn to the constitutive 
elements. Various additional references to EPR policies are made 
throughout the article.
EPR
The fundamental guidelines of the OECD define EPR as ‘an 
environmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsi-
bility for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a 
product’s life cycle’ (OECD, 2001; or Walls, 2006: 1).
In all practical applications, EPR should provide incentives 
for producers for a DfE, such that, for example, disassembling 
their products after the product’s lifetime becomes far easier. 
More precisely, an EPR policy is, again according to OECD 
(2001), mainly characterised by the shifting of responsibility 
(physically and/or economically; fully or partially) upstream 
toward the producer and away from municipalities (and, there-
fore, also from households).
From an economic point of view, the definition of EPR raises 
the following question: If an EPR policy should motivate produc-
ers for DfE, this definition seems to blame, at least in the first 
place, the producers for some environmental problems, some 
pollution or some environmental degradation associated with 
their products. The role of the consumers seems to be neglected, 
although demand for a particular design of certain commodities 
may lead to the environmental problem in question. Without any 
further policy guidance, producers are likely to pay attention 
mainly to the market situation. In this context, one must not for-
get that typically only the producers have the knowledge required 
and relevant for a DfE of their products. Policy-makers are there-
fore dependent on the cooperation of the producers, and this 
‘cooperation’ must be stimulated through appropriate policy 
tools. Thus, DfE will only happen if the market situation is – by 
chance – in favour of environment-friendly designs.
This view seems to be supported by Gupt and Sahay (2015). 
In their study ascertaining the most important aspects of cases 
of EPR from developed and developing countries, they arrive 
at the conclusion that the ‘success of EPR depends on the 
upstream management …’, and that ‘changes in the design of 
the products to reduce environmental impacts (DfE) … do not 
seem to have a major role in the success of EPR …’ (Gupt and 
Sahay, 2015: 609).
Also, according to Massarutto, ‘EPR has become a corner-
stone of solid waste management policies throughout the world’ 
(Massarutto, 2014: 11). He argues, ‘that policies inspired by EPR 
have been indeed successful, but probably for different purposes 
and for different reasons than initially believed’ (Massarutto, 
2014: 11), and concedes at the same time ‘the impact of EPR on 
green design and product innovation has been much lower than 
expected’ (Massarutto, 2014: 14). It is likely that the reason for 
the latter observation is a result of the, in general, incomplete 
specification of EPR policies.
Consequently, postulating DfE by means of a simple com-
mand policy will, in general, not be enough, and EPR policies 
risk violating CE II by neglecting the role of consumers, thereby 
losing effectiveness.
EPR seems to provide an easy way to put the burden of envi-
ronmental pollution on others; in this case on producers. Of 
course, producers should not and cannot be dismissed – they too 
are responsible for the protection of the environment. However, 
they are also dependent on their customers, and EPR policies 
should therefore respect the preferences of the consumers in 
order to benefit the environment even more. Wiesmeth and Häckl 
(2011) discuss these and some other aspects of relevance for an 
EPR policy.
Constitutive Element I: Dependence on 
local conditions
Remark: This first constitutive element is meanwhile recognised 
in many holistic environmental policies. It justifies, for example, 
that IWM policies differ across regions.
Feasible solutions of the allocation problems, in particular 
market solutions, depend on local conditions. These include 
wealth and preferences of the consumers, production possibilities, 
availability of natural resources, climatic and geographical condi-
tions, the economic situation in general, trade relations and, in the 
context considered here, the technical infrastructure. Consequently, 
the integration of the relevant environmental commodities into the 
allocation problems, the basis for a well-designed environmental 
policy, postulates the careful consideration of the local situation. 
Thus, one should not transfer the details of an integrated 
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environmental policy applied in one country to another country, 
without a closer look at the relevant local conditions.
This issue refers also to the ‘harmonization efforts’ in the EU. 
Bartl (2014) addresses the EU Waste Framework Directive 
(WFD) 2008/98/EC with its sometimes unifying and standardis-
ing attempts. The same critique applies to many of the other EU 
Directives in the broader area of waste management. Also in this 
context, Broitman et al. (2012) draw the attention to schemes of 
waste management, which are often designed at a national level 
with local conditions neglected.
What is, however, perhaps still acceptable for the member 
states of the EU with their comparable standards of living, might 
be critical for countries or regions with greater relevant differ-
ences regarding the local conditions. Arlosoroff (1991) points to 
these problems in the early years of IWM already, and Agamuthu 
and Victor refer to ‘the pitfall of … the simplistic adoption of 
policies and legislations from other countries’ “purportedly” suc-
cessful waste management system without taking into context the 
local, cultural and socio-economic waste management issues’ 
(Agamuthu and Victor, 2011: 952).
Changes in the technical infrastructure have an effect on the 
local conditions, too. They can support or weaken an environ-
mental policy. Gallardo et al. (2010) identify and investigate dif-
ferent collection systems for household waste in Spain. 
Interestingly they find that ‘the percentages of separation at 
source of paper/cardboard and lightweight packaging are still far 
from reaching the targets set by law’ (see the Abstract). Probably, 
an adequate incentive structure integrating the households in the 
sense of CE II and observing CE I should complement the techni-
cal environment.
In a related context, Lewis et al. develop a life cycle-based 
framework to optimise the collection and treatment of waste. 
They also state that ‘given the complexity of SWM [solid waste 
management], even subtle changes to SWM programs pose 
potential for unintended environmental consequences’ (Lewis 
et al., 2013: 51), and Marshall et al. (2013) contrast ‘the history 
and current paradigms of SWM practices and policies in industri-
alised countries with the current challenges and complexities 
faced in the developing country SWM’ (see the Abstract).
The meanwhile broad acceptance of this first constitutive ele-
ment cannot yet be confirmed for the second: Integrating involved 
agents and addressing them with adequate framework conditions. 
Marshall and Farahbakhsh note in this context that prior to 2000 
none of the models in SWM ‘considered involving all relevant 
stakeholders’ (Marshall and Farahbakhsh, 2013: 988).
Constitutive Element II: Integrating 
affected economic agents and addressing 
a potentially large number with 
appropriate framework conditions
Remark: All agents, who are affected by the goals of a certain 
environmental policy, have to be integrated into this policy. 
‘Affected’ thereby means that if a group of agents is not adequately 
integrated into the policy, these agents might significantly change 
their economic behaviour, thereby undermining some of the goals 
of the policy. This constitutive element is recognised in an increas-
ing number of publications on holistic policies, although the 
requirement of addressing a potentially large number of agents has 
not attracted much attention so far. Command-and-control policies 
are often dominating. Due to control costs they are, however, more 
suitable for addressing a small group of agents.
Besides the relevance of local conditions, it is a general obser-
vation that the allocation problems in a market system are inter-
dependent. This means that any attempt to modify the solution on 
one market typically has consequences for the solution on other 
markets. Therefore, any interference with the allocation prob-
lems, also regarding the infrastructure, can affect a multitude of 
economic agents. Consequently, an integrated environmental 
policy has to respect these agents adequately. This sounds 
straightforward, although there are crucial consequences. 
Heidrich et al. (2009) applied the ‘affect criterion’ in a template 
and matrix model in order to identify stakeholder groups, which 
may vary, of course, with the problem in consideration. For a 
policy maker, the immediate consequence is to identify the 
‘affected’ economic agents and, equally important, to integrate 
them adequately into the policy.
Functional holistic environmental policies, as a substitute for 
the market mechanism, should therefore integrate all relevant 
(or ‘affected’) economic agents. Referring again to IWM as an 
example, waste management should address all households – 
first, of course, with respect to all issues pertaining to the collec-
tion and separation of waste, but also with respect to waste 
reduction, where the cooperation of the households is needed in 
particular. Taylor (2000) addresses incentives for individuals in 
this context, and Salhofer et al. (2008) show that the prevention 
potential can reach some 10% of the relevant waste stream with 
clear evidence of the environmental benefits (see Gentil et al., 
2011). The unsatisfactory situation with the environmentally 
friendly collection of WEEE in various industrialised countries, 
investigated by Ongondo et al. (2011), illustrates exactly this 
point. Similarly, Guerrero et al. (2013) find that ‘waste manage-
ment involves a large number of different stakeholders, with dif-
ferent fields of interest. … Detailed understandings on who the 
stakeholders are and the responsibilities they have in the struc-
ture are important steps in order to establish an efficient and 
effective system’ (Guerrero et al., 2013: 227). Of course, ‘stake-
holders’ are synonymous for affected agents.
Barr et al., for example, point to the need to ‘understanding 
the complexities of how households deal with waste in the home’, 
and they highlight ‘the roles of producers, consumers, retailers, 
local authorities and the waste management industry as key 
stakeholders’ regarding any attempts to prevent waste and favour 
reuse (Barr et al., 2013: 68). Besides mentioning the relevance of 
local solutions in solid waste management, Caniato et al. postu-
late that experts in solid waste management must take into 
account ‘the complex interaction of stakeholders’, potentially 
enhanced through social network structures (Caniato et al., 2014: 
939) (see also Uyarra and Gee (2013) for the relevance of the 
‘networked infrastructures’).
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An interesting aspect in this context refers to the role of the 
informal sector in IWM. Lange argues that a ‘ban of informal 
sector activities would be socially counterproductive’ (Lange, 
2013: 1323). Paul et al. (2012) show how the elaborate integra-
tion of the informal sector into municipal solid waste manage-
ment in Iloilo City, Philippines, helps to observe local conditions 
and provides positive effects both for the workers in the informal 
sector and the environment.
Kalimo et al. (2015) relate EPR, mainly in the context of 
WEEE, to the roles of various stakeholders. In particular, their 
article ‘analyzes the creation of design incentives …’ (Kalimo 
et al., 2015: 41). It examines the question ‘what should fall within 
the scope of a producer’s responsibility and what should fall 
within the responsibility of other stakeholders’ (Kalimo et al., 
2015: 41). Thus, in view of the current approach to integrated 
policies, the need to integrate other stakeholders into EPR has 
been clearly addressed in this article.
Moreover, these considerations show that environmental poli-
cies often need to address a large number of economic agents. 
However, owing to the highly probable tragedy-of-the-commons-
like behaviour, classical command-and-control policies require the 
more or less continuous monitoring of the compliance of the eco-
nomic agents with the environmental regulations. As this is in gen-
eral difficult, costly and politically non-feasible, it seems more 
appropriate to establish framework conditions to stimulate and 
motivate households and business companies to a cooperative 
behaviour in the sense of the goals of the integrated environmental 
policy. Taylor arrives in this context at the conclusion that the suc-
cess of command-and-control regulations is ‘clearly linked to the 
social-psychological and economic incentives’ (Taylor, 2000: 409).
Nevertheless, not all holistic approaches to environmental 
policy respect these requirements adequately. The following are 
examples with EPR characteristics.
Example 1: End-of-life vehicle (ELV) legislation. Remark: As 
EPR policy in a special field, the ELV legislation addresses rele-
vant economic agents: Owners of an ELV can return their scrap 
vehicle to the manufacturer at no cost, and manufacturers are 
expected to recycle returned scrap vehicles. Consequently, manu-
facturers have some motivation for DfE. However, uncontrolled 
exports of used and also scrap cars to non-EU countries, point-
ing to a non-adequate integration of the manufacturers into the 
policy, render the ELV policy doubtful.
At first glance, the ELV legislations, in the EU in general and 
in Germany in particular, seem to have a more favourable impact 
regarding EPR. Germany’s reuse and recycling rates stay consist-
ently above the rates postulated in the ELV legislation thanks to 
the efforts of the recycling industry (see http://www.umweltbun-
desamt.de/en/topics/waste-resources/product-stewardship-
waste-management/scrap-cars). Moreover, Gerrard and 
Kandlikar (2007) show that ‘legislative factors and market forces 
have led to innovation in recycling …’ and that ‘carmakers are 
also taking steps to design for recycling and for disassembly’ (see 
the Abstract). In this sense, the ELV legislation induces ‘links’ 
between the decisions of consumers and producers. The section 
‘Constitutive Element III: Linked signals for an integrated envi-
ronmental policy’ provides more details regarding the nature and 
necessity of these links as another constitutive element.
A closer look at Germany, however, shows that in addition to 
the recovery and recycling of approximately half a million scrap 
cars in 2012, there are a million used cars exported to EU coun-
tries, for which the EU ELV Directive is relevant, and 0.39 mil-
lion used cars exported to non-EU countries (see again the link to 
www.umweltbundesamt.de).
As the distinction between a ‘used’ (or reusable) car and a 
‘scrap’ car is not always perfectly clear, end-of-life vehicles may 
end up as ‘reusable’ cars in non-EU countries. Also, owners may 
prefer to sell their scrap vehicle for a small amount of money 
instead of returning it without cost to the manufacturer. This situ-
ation is aggravated by the fact that the Correspondents’ Guidelines 
No 9 (see EU, 2011), regulating shipment of scrap cars to coun-
tries outside the EU, are not legally binding.
Improper vehicle maintenance, and improper dismantling 
and scrapping activities in developing and transformation 
countries are the consequence and pose a hazard to health and 
the environment – in addition to the loss of valuable raw 
material.
These deficiencies of the current ELV legislation result also 
from the lack of a clear definition of a reusable car in distinction 
to a scrap car. And, each scrap car exported need not be recycled 
at presumably high costs: There are vested interests stimulating 
exports of used cars in poor shape.
Returning to CE II, the ELV policy thus does not adequately 
integrate car manufacturers. In view of these vested interests, the 
decision on whether a car is reusable or a scrap car, and what 
should happen with it, should be transferred to a neutral institu-
tion, a ‘compliance scheme’. This issue is also of relevance for 
WEEE policies and discussed in the section ‘A proposal for an 
integrated WEEE policy’.
The ELV legislation is not only an attempt to EPR in car manu-
facturing, but also a guideline to ‘individual producer responsibil-
ity’ (IPR). Rotter et al. (2009) consider IPR as a further development 
of EPR, with producers bearing responsibility exactly for their 
products only, a situation that characterises end-of-life vehicles 
returned for recycling. The question posed by Rotter et al. (2009) 
is then, whether the obligations according to the verified shares of 
clearly identifiable WEEE, provide stronger incentives for DfE. 
Some degree of IPR seems to be indeed necessary for an effective 
integrated environmental policy. Without IPR, there will likely be 
incentives for appropriate avoidance strategies, rendering the envi-
ronmental policy ineffective, as the above considerations regard-
ing significant exports of used cars show. In view of our approach, 
IPR corresponds to the second and, in particular, to the third con-
stitutive element. See also van Rossem (2008) for more aspects of 
IPR in the WEEE Directive of the EU.
Summary ELV Legislation
CE I: There is a dense network of companies to take back, treat and 
recycle ELVs in Germany and the other member states of the EU.
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CE II: The framework conditions with the take back requirement 
at no cost to the car holders do not adequately integrate car manu-
facturers with the consequence of a significant number of scrap 
cars ending up in non-EU countries.
CE III: The actions of the car holders (returning many ELVs) 
generate IPR, at least to some extent, and provide a signal for 
DfE, though weakened through scrap cars in non-EU countries, 
to reduce recycling costs.
In the context of integrated environmental policies, framework 
conditions should replace classical command-and-control poli-
cies, if it is necessary to address a large number of economic 
agents with comparatively small control costs. Vice versa, if one 
attempts to solve an environmental issue, which requires the 
cooperation of a large number of agents, by directing the policy 
only to a small number of agents of a particular group or to the 
agents on one side of the market only, one should be prepared for 
surprises. The following example of the ‘German refillable quota 
issue’, which is moreover an example for violating the principle 
of integrating all stakeholders, helps to clarify this point. 
Interesting to note: The deficiencies of this regulation are not the 
result of non-compliance with the regulation.
Example 2: The German refillable quota issue. Remark: The 
earlier regulations regarding refillable drinks containers in Ger-
many did not address consumers as an important group of stake-
holders, as a group of affected agents. The missing integration of 
the consumers into the policy caused its failure resulting in a 
lock-in effect.
The purpose of the German Packaging Ordinance is to avoid or 
reduce the environmental impacts of waste arising from packag-
ing. In order to achieve this purpose, the ordinance rightly stipu-
lates to regulate the market behaviour of all concerned parties. In 
its current version, among other things, the ordinance aims to 
increase the share of beverages filled into reusable drinks packag-
ing and ecologically advantageous one-way drinks packaging to 
at least 80% (see Germany, 2009 for an older English version).
The refillables quota issue has its roots in the first versions of 
the Packaging Ordinance (see Germany, 1998). There is a general 
obligation to charge a deposit on non-reusable drinks packaging 
(see Germany, 1998: § 9). However, till 2003, there was an 
exemption from the obligation to charge deposits as long as, 
roughly speaking, the combined proportion of drinks packaged in 
reusable packaging stayed at or above 72%, the actual share in 
1991 (see Germany, 1998: subsection 9(2)).
Of course, these regulations to divert packaging and to reduce 
packaging waste focused almost exclusively on the producers: 
With the threat of a mandatory deposit, they should increase the 
share of refillable drinks containers. The regulations did not 
directly address the consumers, although their drinking habits 
could have a sizable influence on this combined share of reusable 
drinks containers.
Nevertheless, the policy failed, the refillable quota has 
dropped far below 72% since 1991 to less than 50%, and the 
German government had – according to the regulations of the 
Packaging Ordinance – to implement the deposit scheme in 
January 2003. It is a fact that Germany is now locked into a sys-
tem it did not really want in the first place. This ‘lock-in effect’ 
results from the development and installation of quite sophisti-
cated machinery to take back empty drinks packages and return 
the deposit fee.
One of the main reasons of this unintended development was 
the requirement of a ‘combined’ quota of refillable drinks pack-
ages: Consider a producer of drinks offering a certain share of 
drinks in reusable packages. This producer will raise the share of 
drinks in refillable containers only, if customers are expected to 
increase their demand for drinks in refillable containers. In addi-
tion, such a move means investments in new equipment and 
higher variable costs for additional logistics services. The argu-
ment that the producer could thereby prevent the mandatory 
deposit fee is not decisive: It is always better to let other produc-
ers go ahead with their risky investments and profit then from 
their decisions. This phenomenon, which is observable in other 
environmental contexts, is the well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma.
In summary, this reasoning does not imply that the deposit fee 
does not affect drinks producers. It just means that the require-
ment on the size of the combined share does not play a decisive 
role in decisions regarding the individual share. In this sense, this 
policy violated the IPR property mentioned above.
Clearly, the missing integration of the consumers into this 
environmental policy is to blame for the unintended and at that 
time certainly unexpected result, thereby demonstrating the 
necessity of the second constitutive element of an integrated 
environmental policy. Producers focused on the preferences of 
their customers and not so much on this combined proportion, 
which they individually could not or did not want to affect any-
way. Ferrara and Plourde (2003), who analyse the effects of vari-
ous regulatory measures on producers’ choices regarding 
packaging in the presence of consumers with differing demand 
intensities, support this view. One of their conclusions is that 
‘inducing consumers to recycle and return packaging becomes an 
essential facet of the problem’ of increasing the market share of 
reusable packaging (Ferrara and Plourde, 2003: 10).
Among other possibilities, a system of tradable certificates for 
one-way drinks containers allows integrating the large number of 
consumers into such a policy in an appropriate way. In this case, 
consumers would likely be obliged to buy drinks in one-way con-
tainers at higher prices, the costs of the certificates would raise 
consumer prices. This would affect their consumption behaviour 
– thus integrating them into the environmental policy and re-
establishing the IPR property.
As already mentioned, the current version of the German 
Packaging Ordinance aims to increase the share of reusable 
drinks packaging and ecologically advantageous one-way drinks 
packaging to at least 80%. However, beyond the advice: ‘The 
Federal Government shall conduct the necessary surveys on 
the respective shares and shall publish the results annually in the 
Federal Gazette’ (see Germany, 2009: Section 1(2)), there are no 
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instruments with which this goal could or should be attained, 
there is no further guidance of the economic agents, neither pro-
ducers nor consumers, to comply with this goal. A difficult 
endeavour, in view of the lock-in effect mentioned, and also in 
view of the missing constitutive element of an integrated envi-
ronmental policy.
Summary refillable quota issue
CE I: The situation regarding drinks in Germany in the 1990s 
technically allowed both refillables and one-way containers, but 
was ready for a higher share of refillables.
CE II: The policy addressed only producers. The fact that con-
sumers were not integrated into the policy through appropriate 
framework conditions induced its failure.
CE III: The demand and supply decisions of the consumers and 
producers regarding refillables provided signals, which were 
linked, but unfortunately not with the goals of the policy.
Another policy issue is the (possible) ban of the herbicide 
Glyphosat in the EU. The following example discusses this issue 
with the focus on integrating affected agents.
Example 3: The (possible) ban of glyphosat. Remark: A ban is 
a common policy tool for preventing the use of hazardous materi-
als or processes. It constitutes a simple command-and-control 
policy, typically referring to producers and users of these materi-
als or processes. The question that arises in the context consid-
ered here is, whether these producers and users constitute the 
only group of affected agents in the sense of CE II?
The EU member states are currently discussing the possible 
ban of the wide-band herbicide Glyphosat. Of course, the ban 
refers to the chemical and the agricultural industry. As there is 
only a relatively small number of producers, distributors and 
importers of this herbicide, it should be no problem to monitor 
this ban, which immediately includes the agricultural industry. If 
the chemical industry in the EU continues to produce Glyphosat 
for the export markets (outside the EU), the policy makers have 
to decide whether this should be allowed or not.
What about consumers? Will they be ‘affected’ by this ban in 
the sense of CE II or not? In order to investigate this issue, assume 
that the ban of Glyphosat will raise costs for agricultural products 
all over the EU, followed by price increases. At least some of the 
agricultural products could be imported from outside the EU, 
perhaps at lower prices. If these imported agricultural goods are 
still produced with the application of Glyphosat, an interesting 
question arises, even if the herbicide is not detectable in the 
imported products: Shall we allow that we consume agricultural 
goods, which are produced by means of a chemical, which can be 
hazardous to the people in the exporting countries?
If the policy makers arrive at an affirmative answer, then con-
sumers have to be integrated into this policy, they are ‘affected’, 
as with their buying behaviour they risk to undermine the goals 
of the policy. There are a couple of ways to address this large 
number of consumers, to integrate them into the policy. First, 
importers of agricultural products could be forced to label these 
products accordingly, if produced with Glyphosat. Then the pur-
chasing decision is left to the consumers. Or, a (Pigou) tax is 
levied on these imported products, which again leaves the pur-
chasing decision regarding the now more expensive imports to 
the consumers. Alternatively, there could be a ban on these 
imports. In this case, consumers are also integrated in the policy 
in the sense that they are forced to reorient their purchasing deci-
sions. Observe that the last two options may not be feasible 
regarding regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
This example clearly shows that the question regarding 
affected agents is depending on the details of the policy and its 
goals.
Summary (possible) ban of glyphosat
CE I: The agricultural industry in the EU could probably produce 
without applying the herbicide Glysophat.
CE II: A ban of Glysophat affects the chemical industry, of 
course, the distributors and the importers, and then the agricul-
tural industry. Whether the consumers constitute a group of 
affected agents, depends on the detailed goals of the policy.
CE III: As there is only a small number of producers, distributors 
and importers of Glyphosat, a ban of selling Glyphosat in the EU 
as a special command-and-control policy is an appropriate tool, 
which immediately extends to the agricultural industry. If con-
sumers have to be integrated into the policy, then additional tools 
are necessary. In this case the signals to be monitored refer to 
imported commodities produced with the application of 
Glyphosat. As a ban of Glyphosat in the EU leaves no room for 
the industry, there is no need to link these signals to production 
activities of the industry in this case.
So far, these issues of determining the groups of affected agents 
and of addressing a potentially large number of agents with suit-
able framework conditions have not yet attracted much attention 
in the literature. Nevertheless, they result from the integration of 
the environmental commodities into the allocation problems, and 
from a careful analysis of the available policy tools.
The following considerations, which are of similar impor-
tance for an integrated environmental policy, will refer to signals 
on which economic agents base their decisions. Identifying 
appropriate signals and linking them through appropriate policy 
tools constitutes the last essential element of an integrated envi-
ronmental policy.
Constitutive Element III: Linked signals 
for an integrated environmental policy
Remark: This last constitutive element is for various reasons the 
most important one and at the same time the most difficult one to 
implement. There is not much visible in the literature so far.
In a pure market economy, individual agents, consumers and 
producers, use the price signals to formulate their demand and 
supply decisions. The observable prices and expected future 
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prices for regular commodities contain, in general, sufficient 
information for optimal decisions. With the presence of environ-
mental commodities, however, price signals are either missing, 
because of the public goods property of certain environmental 
commodities, or are distorted owing to external effects. 
Consequently, effective environmental policies are dependent 
and have to be made dependent on other, additional signals. 
Usually, more than one signal will be necessary to provide and 
disseminate the relevant information. As some of these signals 
are more important for consumers and others more important for 
producers, it is an immediate consequence that these signals, 
which are basic for an integrated environmental policy, have to 
be linked through the policy by means of appropriate policy 
tools. Observe that this requirement is automatically satisfied in 
a pure market economy, where both consumers and producers 
rely upon the same price signals providing complete information. 
Moreover, market prices are interdependent and ‘linked’ through 
the markets.
Relevant signals typically refer to different stages of a prod-
uct’s lifecycle, including the design and the post-consumer 
stage. According to OECD, ‘EPR seeks to integrate signals 
related to the environmental characteristics of products and pro-
duction processes throughout the product chain’ (OECD, 2001: 
9). McKerlie et al. (2006) highlight EPR programmes ‘with 
clear legislation that encourages sustainable product design by 
delivering a full range of signals to producers’ (see the Abstract). 
The task of an integrated environmental policy is then to select 
the appropriate signals with relevance for all stakeholders, not 
only for producers, and to link them through suitable instru-
ments such that the policy goals can be achieved. This is, as 
experience shows, a challenging task, which is not always sim-
ple and straightforward.
To some extent Cossu and Masi (2013) confirm this point. In 
their analysis of the development of the management of munici-
pal solid waste in Italy, they observe ‘a steady transformation in 
terms of technology and organization’ with legislation as the 
driving force of the system and economic measures in the form of 
incentives and penalties added later. One of their conclusions is 
that these economic measures ‘had often motivated technological 
and organizational solutions not otherwise justifiable’ (Cossu and 
Masi, 2013: 2541). This points to missing constitutive elements 
of the policy, in this case to missing signals or insufficiently 
linked signals.
The WEEE legislations in various industrialised countries 
provide interesting examples for this issue. The background is 
that the amount of e-waste is rapidly growing, especially, but not 
only, in the industrialised countries. (In 2011, there were 1.5 
mobile phones per capita in Russia, 1.36 in Brazil, 0.75 China 
and 0.70 in India. In comparison, there was approximately one 
mobile phone per US citizen (see http://www.rediff.com/busi-
ness/slide-show/slide-show-1-tech-india-among-nations-with-
most-mobile-phones-in-the-world/20130510.htm#1).) Thus, 
attention has focused on regulations to handle WEEE in a 
responsible and environment-friendly way. Nevertheless, unsafe 
handling of WEEE is a common observation for most of the 
developing world, aggravated by semi-legal or even illegal 
exports to those countries (see Li et al. (2013) for a survey on 
source and destination countries for WEEE). Industrialised coun-
tries are also worried about the future environmental impacts of 
the large amounts of WEEE or parts of it that are currently land-
filled (Babu et al., 2007; Janz and Bilitewski, 2009; Oguchi et al., 
2012; Ongondo et al., 2011).
In order to further motivate the third constitutive element, the 
following example investigates the internal structure of the 
WEEE legislation in the EU, based on the European Directive on 
WEEE (EU, 2012). The current version of the German ElektroG 
(Germany (2015) follows this Directive closely, and WEEE poli-
cies in other countries can be analysed in a similar way. The fact 
that there are different approaches to WEEE is in accordance 
with the principle of dependence on local conditions discussed in 
the section ‘Constitutive Element I: Dependence on local 
conditions’.
Example 4: The Directive of the EU on WEEE. Remark: The 
signals associated with the decisive regulations of WEEE poli-
cies based on the EU Directive are not sufficiently linked to moti-
vate the economic agents to fully comply with the goals and the 
letter of the regulations in a context of limited control possibili-
ties by the authorities.
The decisive regulations of the EU Directive (EU, 2012) refer 
to product design, separate collection of WEEE including a man-
datory take-back system and treatment of waste equipment. 
These four policy areas are, in fact, characteristic for most WEEE 
regulations in industrialised countries. Differences refer mainly 
to the details of the requirement of a separate collection and the 
structure of the take-back system. These specifications allow a 
careful investigation of quality and origin of the signals and the 
integration of the signals into the policy. The links between these 
signals deserve particular attention. See also BIO Intelligence 
Service (2013) for a review of the scope of this WEEE Directive 
of the EU.
•• Product design: Article 4 of the EU Directive postulates: 
‘Member States shall take appropriate measures so that the 
ecodesign requirements facilitating re-use and treatment of 
WEEE … are applied …’. The associated signal refers, of 
course, to the degree of DfE, to the degree of implementation 
of the required design modifications for electrical and elec-
tronic equipment.•• Separate collection: Paragraph 1 of Article 5 stipulates a sep-
arate collection of WEEE: ‘Member States shall adopt appro-
priate measures to minimize the disposal of WEEE in the 
form of unsorted municipal waste, to ensure the correct treat-
ment of all collected WEEE and to achieve a high level of 
separate collection of WEEE …’. The associated signal, the 
share of WEEE collected separately, addresses primarily con-
sumers, and affects their transaction costs.•• Take-back system: Paragraph 2 (a) of Article 5 demands that 
‘Member States shall ensure that systems are set up allowing 
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final holders and distributors to return such waste at least free 
of charge …’. Moreover, according to Paragraph 2 (d) of 
Article 5 ‘producers are allowed to set up and to operate indi-
vidual and/or collective take-back systems for WEEE from 
private households …’. As these regulations leave some 
degrees of freedom, they deserve some closer inspection in 
view of the issue of IPR addressed in Example 1.•• Treatment: According to Paragraph 1 of Article 8 ‘Member 
States shall ensure that all separately collected WEEE 
undergoes proper treatment’. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 stip-
ulates that: ‘WEEE exported out of the Union shall count 
towards the fulfilment of obligations and targets … if … the 
exporter can prove that the treatment took place in condi-
tions that are equivalent to the requirements of this 
Directive’. These articles address producers and leave them 
some room for making decisions, not much affected, how-
ever, by other signals or decisions. Again, these regulations 
deserve closer inspection.
It is important to note that these signals cover relevant stages of 
the product chain of electrical and electronic equipment. 
Moreover, if producers and consumers fully complied with the 
letter of these regulations, the Directive and the more specific 
ElektroG could certainly achieve their goals. However, the ‘chain 
of incentives’ provided by these policies have some weak points, 
which are responsible for various critical developments regard-
ing collection and export of WEEE.
The separate collection of WEEE, stipulated for owners of 
WEEE in all versions of the EU Directive and the ElektroG, is 
costly, at least in terms of time needed to transport pieces of 
WEEE to the collection points. Without a strict enforcement, 
which is in general not feasible, consumers will not always 
comply with this regulation. The ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ 
can misguide consumers to put small WEEE into the garbage 
collection or to ‘donate’ other pieces of WEEE to private col-
lectors for export. For example, Janz and Bilitewski (2009: 
116), found that 1% of the municipal waste in Germany con-
sists of discarded small electrical and electronic appliances, 
which can constitute more than 50% of the total heavy metal 
load in household waste with possibly severe consequences 
for the mechanical–biological treatment of waste and the 
groundwater.
Moreover, in accordance with the first constitutive element, 
the principle of dependence on local conditions, commodities can 
be valuable enough to be reusable and reused in some developing 
countries, but not in the country of origin. This view is supported 
by the required ‘check’ prior to treatment as to whether the waste 
equipment can be sent for reuse, leaving some room for decision-
making and pondering.
Of course, most consumers in the industrialised countries will 
– owing to their supposedly high environmental awareness – take 
WEEE to the official collection points. Tempting opportunities 
remain to discard small WEEE with the domestic garbage. Again, 
as Gallardo et al. (2010) and Lewis et al. (2013) point out, appro-
priate technical infrastructures might contribute towards better 
collection results. The question remains, to what extent suitable 
policy tools might help in this regard.
Manufacturers do not have to take back and treat WEEE that 
is not returned according to these regulations. In ambiguous 
cases, they will decide in favour of a reuse, of exporting waste 
equipment, at least as long as this seems the cheaper alternative 
for them. The signals regarding the decisions of the consumers 
have no effect on them. As reports from Germany show, in spite 
of political efforts to reduce semi-legal and illegal shipments of 
WEEE out of the EU, these activities seem to continue (http://
www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/press/pressinformation/export-of-
waste-electrical-electronic-equipment). This apparent non-com-
pliance with the regulations and the letter of the regulations is an 
indication of a policy failure. Babu et al. refer to the word ‘recy-
cling’ that obviously helped industrialised countries ‘to justify 
the free trading of hazardous materials to the developing coun-
tries …’ (Babu et al., 2007: 311).
Gui et al. (2016) analyse cost allocations in collective EPR 
systems with large collection and recycling networks, thereby 
developing cost allocation mechanisms that stabilise participa-
tion in such systems and guarantee an allocation of the recy-
cling costs, which largely corresponds to the returned WEEE of 
the participating manufacturers. Observe that the focus of this 
article in this context is more on potential vested interests of 
manufacturers in EPR systems (see also Kalimo et al., 2015: 
49). To make it clear: Collective systems need not contradict 
integrated waste policies, if there is consensus on the cost-allo-
cation as indicated here.
What are then the incentives of the manufacturers to imple-
ment the signals referring to product design, again without strict 
control from the authorities, which is not feasible in this situation 
anyway? Producers will change the design in favour of an ecode-
sign, if the new design remains attractive for customers and/or is 
less costly to handle than the previous one – over its lifetime 
including recycling, or if increasing revenue helps to cover rising 
costs. Again, if it remains possible to export substantial shares 
of WEEE, aggregate disassembling and recycling costs will 
decrease, providing less incentive for DfE. Thus, under these cir-
cumstances, only the purchasing decisions of the consumers have 
a substantial effect on the activities of the producers. In particu-
lar, there is no significant link between the collection rates of 
WEEE and DfE.
The concept of IPR mentioned above could stimulate DfE 
(see also Walls, 2006: 31ff, for an analysis of different payment 
schemes in the context of IPR in the Dutch WEEE policy), if it is 
supported by appropriately linked signals. See also van Rossem 
(2008) for more details on IPR in the WEEE Directive of the EU.
Summary EU Directive on WEEE
CE I: The regulations regarding collection points and recycling 
possibilities for WEEE are in accordance with the local condi-
tions in the EU.
CE II: The policy addresses producers (DfE) and consumers 
(separate collection), but the framework conditions do not 
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address these agents appropriately to comply with the 
regulations.
CE III: The decisions of the consumers and producers yield sig-
nals, which are, however, insufficiently linked with the goals of 
the policy.
The following section proposes an integrated environmental pol-
icy for WEEE. The focus is thereby on the links between appro-
priate signals providing the intended incentives.
A proposal for an integrated WEEE 
policy
Remark: The signals in this WEEE policy are taken from the 
decisive regulations of a WEEE policy and linked through appro-
priate policy tools to guide the economic agents to comply with 
the policy goals.
Consider the following approach: Owners of WEEE get a 
‘refund’ for returning e-waste to an official collection point. The 
refund depends on the category and on some other characteristics 
of the end-of-life product. Of particular importance is the depend-
ence of the refund on the degree of difficulty to disassemble the 
equipment, thus, on DfE, and perhaps on the market value of the 
recyclable substances.
There is already some practical experience with this kind of 
refund. Zhu et al. (2012) report on the ‘trade-in policy for home 
appliances and electronics’ implemented in China in 2009. 
According to this policy, (registered) consumers in the pilot prov-
inces and cities can gain a 10% subsidy on a new product if they 
provide an old one (Zhu et al., 2012: 1217). Besides stimulating 
demand for new products, this trade-in policy effectively pro-
motes the collection of WEEE (Zhu et al., 2012: 1218, Table 4). 
However, for EPR this special trade-in policy alone is not yet 
sufficient (Zhu et al., 2012: 1220). In particular, there is no stimu-
lus for DfE, and some consumers started to exploit the system by 
buying cheap second-hand products just to get the subsidy on a 
new product (Zhu et al., 2012: 1219). Parts of the policy are, thus, 
linked in a wrong way.
Moreover, one could also apply the concept of a deposit fee 
on electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) to stimulate sepa-
rate collection of WEEE – similar to the mandatory deposit fee 
on non-reusable drinks packaging in Germany (see Example 2). 
According to the German Advisory Council on the Environment, 
deposit schemes are an effective tool, in particular for small 
EEE, such as mobile phones and computers (Wilts and von 
Gries, 2016: Chapter 3). There is also some experience with 
these deposit schemes for EEE in various countries, among 
them Austria, Italy and the US (see again Wilts and von Gries, 
2016: Chapter 3).
The next element in our approach is an independent ‘compli-
ance scheme’, similar to the compliance schemes for packaging 
waste in Germany, which producers or importers have to join and 
which takes back WEEE and consigns it to treatment and recy-
cling (see again Walls (2006: 35ff) for the WEEE policy in 
Korea). This compliance scheme receives fees from the manufac-
turers, which depend also on the characteristics of the products 
mentioned. Moreover, this scheme is in charge of issuing the 
refunds to the consumers. The scheme of refunds and fees should 
be balanced over time. The scheme can be compatible with cost 
allocation mechanisms (see Gui et al. (2016) on this issue), which 
allow sharing the recycling costs in accordance with returned 
WEEE of the participating manufacturers.
How to determine the fees manufacturers have to pay for their 
products? Of course, these fees have to depend on the level of 
DfE. It should be possible to develop certain (environmentally 
relevant) specifications that a product should have for DfE, simi-
lar to the energy efficiency specifications that have already been 
introduced for many household appliances, such as refrigerators, 
washing machines, etc. Some of these energy efficiency regula-
tions extend also to electronic products such as televisions and 
computers (see, for example, EU (2010)), but technical specifica-
tions regarding DfE in general seem still to be missing.
However, after the introduction of certain basic specifications, 
an integrated WEEE policy will induce manufacturers to provide 
such parameters, because this will imply a lower fee, or even a 
subsidy, if their product is above these specifications.
For sure, to determine the fees and refunds is not an easy and 
straightforward endeavour, as the experiences with the feed-in 
tariffs for electricity from renewable sources in Germany proved. 
The too-high tariffs for electricity from photovoltaic modules ini-
tiated unplanned and unexpected activities. Consequently, it is 
necessary to closely observe the relevant situation. On the other 
hand, there is already some experience with the fees for licensing 
of packaging material, for example.
The consequence of this approach is a sequence of signals 
from the product chain with links between them: The consumers 
have a stronger incentive to return WEEE to official collection 
points and ‘leakage’ to export markets declines because export 
decisions are made by the independent compliance scheme and 
not by the manufacturers with their vested interest. Then, as the 
refunds depend on certain characteristics of the WEEE, fees to 
the compliance scheme and the prices of the new products will 
depend on these characteristics as well. In particular, there will be 
higher prices for products without DfE, affecting demand. Thus, 
manufacturers are affected in two ways: First owing to the higher 
recycling rates, recycling costs tend to increase. Moreover, higher 
fees for products with a lower level of DfE can only be sold at 
higher prices, reducing demand for these products. Therefore, if 
a higher level of DfE reduces lifetime costs and stimulates 
demand, producers have a stronger incentive to change the design 
of their products – without intensive monitoring.
Thus, there is a closed link of signals from product design to 
taking back and recycling used and waste equipment. IPR 
enforced through this closed link of signals drives this result, 
with the compliance scheme neutralising some selfish interests of 
the producers. This helps in particular to prevent dubious ship-
ments of WEEE to countries out of the EU. This scheme of fees 
and compensations is linked with, and necessary for, a functional 
WEEE policy.
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The pattern of behaviour necessitating such an approach 
results from the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, and not necessarily 
from a lack of environmental awareness. Similar remarks, 
although differing in certain details, apply to WEEE regulations 
of other countries (see Ongondo et al. (2011) for a survey on 
many countries, Oguchi et al. (2012) for special aspects of the 
WEEE policy in Japan, Zhu et al. (2012) and Yu et al. (2014) for 
the development of a WEEE policy in China and Schnoor (2012) 
for the situation of e-waste in developing countries).
Observe that Kalimo et al. are to some extent addressing these 
issues when they conclude that ‘in order to divide the responsi-
bilities to create incentives, EPR requires an effective regulatory 
framework’, and ‘… public authorities have a responsibility to 
intervene with guidance and regulation in case of market failures’ 
(Kalimo et al., 2015: 53). The approach to an integrated WEEE 
policy attempts such a regulatory framework.
Summary integrated WEEE policy
CE I: The regulations regarding collection points and recycling 
possibilities are in accordance with the local conditions in the 
EU.
CE II: The policy addresses producers (DfE) and consumers 
(separate collection) with framework conditions, which stimulate 
compliance with the letter of the regulations.
CE III: The decisions of the consumers and producers yield sig-
nals, which are linked through policy tools to the policy goals. In 
particular, DfE is linked to buying decisions and collection and 
treatment rates.
Conclusions and summary
The article develops the constitutive elements of an integrated envi-
ronmental policy. The practical examples associated with these ele-
ments demonstrate their necessity for an integrated policy. The 
interaction of the policy with the technical infrastructure is of prac-
tical relevance too, although this issue is not addressed in this arti-
cle. Integrated environmental policies are then holistic approaches 
to environmental policies with all qualities of an allocation mecha-
nism for environmental commodities. Moreover, the practical 
results show that a holistic policy, which violates one of the consti-
tutive elements, risks providing incentives to relevant groups of 
economic agents such that the policy will at least partially fail.
How to design an integrated environmental policy? The 
examples presented and discussed in this article show that there 
is, regarding the concrete choice and linkage of the policy tools, 
no unique way. Rather, each environmental issue requires its own 
specific procedure, only the requirement of the constitutive ele-
ments is universal. Lindeneg (1992) points already to the need to 
choose the instruments in accordance with the goals of the envi-
ronmental policy and the specifics of the environmental problem, 
and Frederico et al. (2009) develop and apply the ‘strategic envi-
ronmental assessment procedure’, which can help to find the 
right policy tools.
However, the central idea of an integrated environmental pol-
icy, namely the integration of the relevant environmental com-
modities into the economic allocation problems, from which it 
derives its name, provides some guidelines.
(a) Determine the goals of the environmental policy. In view 
of a sustainable development, these goals may comprise 
environmental, economic and social goals.
(b) Consider all local conditions that the environmental pol-
icy should respect. This is in agreement with a sustaina-
ble development.
(c) Identify all stakeholders in the environmental issue at 
hand and make sure that all stakeholders are adequately 
integrated into the environmental policy. These are in 
most cases producers and consumers, sometimes also 
located across the border.
(d) Choose the right instruments to address the stakeholders 
and affect their behaviour. In general, a mix of instru-
ments is required, in particular, if there are multiple 
goals. For example, command-and-control policies can 
be used to control and monitor the behaviour of a small 
group of agents. Framework conditions are better suited 
to address a larger number of agents.
(e) Critical parts of any integrated environmental policy are 
the links between appropriate signals required to coordi-
nate the behaviour of the agents. The goal therefore is to 
overcome the Tragedy of the Commons and/or the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma by means of establishing IPR. In 
some special cases, such as a ban of certain chemicals, 
IPR can be achieved directly by a command-and-control 
policy. In most other cases, however, systems of fees and 
refunds supported through compliance schemes are 
required to ‘convince’ economic agents to assume indi-
vidual responsibility of the (waste) products.
(f) The performance of a particular policy could be meas-
ured according to the share of DfE achieved, or, in the 
case of IWM, also through more sophisticated measure-
ment tools such as the ‘Zero Waste Index’ proposed 
in Zaman and Lehmann (2013) or the ‘Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Procedure’ developed by 
Frederico et al. (2009).
In conclusion, there is an art of designing integrated environmen-
tal policies, which consists in establishing IPR, though not neces-
sarily in a 1:1 context. Integrated environmental policies are 
required to support sustainable development in general, and to 
handle complex environmental issues in particular (see Wiesmeth 
and Häckl (2015) for an example regarding chemicals and addi-
tives in textiles). Moreover, because of their applicability in con-
texts of multiple objectives, integrated environmental policies 
can also help to develop and establish innovative environmental 
technologies. These policies correspond with the available tech-
nical infrastructure. Most often, they also provide incentives for 
the further development of this infrastructure.
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